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Abstract The paper retraces the elaboration of a model that accounts for the emergence
of subjectivity—the possibility to distance self from others and oneself—if we consider
people as always taken in social and cultural streams of meaning and tensions. It builds a
model considering first, human experience as possible when a person takes distance
from the here-and-now. Second, it suggests considering two general semiotic streams
that feed in, or support, that distancing—social and cultural discourses, and personal
experience. Third, a knitting model suggests the constant creation of personal patters out
of these two streams. Fourth, a dynamic, star-like model is proposed to account for the
actual and constant emergence of subjectivity out of such social and cultural config-
urations. The model is constituted by a 2, 3 or N-number of eight-shaped crossing loops,
resulting in a star-like model situated in a 3 dimensional space. The proposition is to
analyze a person in a specific situation: the attractors enabling these loops, or end-points
of the star, are the relevant social and cultural elements: others with whom he or she
interacts, specific bodies of shared knowledge, social representations, cultural elements
and tools, and so on. In each situation, the relative strength of these elements, or the
tension they generate, are negotiated by the person; the unique ways of dealing with that
situation and inviting solutions can thus be seen as the emergent subjectivity. The model
is explored to account for developmental dynamics at various scales in the lifecourse.
Finally, the pragmatic interest of a model emphasizing complex configurations, not
simple causalities, is recalled.
Keywords Development . Dynamic . Time .Model . Subjectivity . Sociocultural
psychology
People live in complex social worlds, in which they are never alone. By emphasizing
the social and cultural dimension of mind, do we not risk loosing the idea that there is
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in each person also something that escapes these streams of determinations, or more
radically, that can account for the uniqueness of each person? In this paper, I propose
to build a model that might help us to think the person as emergent subject, within
and through these streams, yet always reinventing herself.
Becoming a “Subject” in a World of Tensions
People Live in Time
Probably in an objective sense, the world is constantly moving and evolving—an
ontological given, as much relevant when describing biological system, as well as
complex human and social systems (e.g., Toren 1999 in anthropology, Valsiner et al.
2009). Human cultures try to capture this irreversibility by calling it “time”, or by
other names. What the shape of time is, and how it is represented, depends upon local
histories and traditions (Yamada and Kato 2006; Lê Quang 2012). Anywhere in the
world, humans find ways to mark the time and render it thinkable and graspable. In
our western worlds, and from a subjective perspective, experienced time has been
quite usefully equated with the flow of consciousness itself—“it flows” (as it rains)
(James 1890). Whatever is the shape of imagined time, physical time is irreversible,
and so is psychological time: if anyone can go back in imagination to the last time he
ate strawberries, or the first time he could bike, every memory is transformed
according to cultural guidance, the present of the person, and its orientation toward
a future (Boyer and Wertsch 2009; Draaisma 2004). In other words, people can never
have twice the same experience, twice the same memory, knowledge or hope. Every
human experience is uniquely new, emerging in the here-and-now from an even
changing present.
Human Experience is Semiotic in Nature
Paradoxically, and beyond the impermanency of things, we experience the
world as stable. We do so, partly because things and events happen to us as
similar, comparable or different to previous ones: we relate these things and
events distant in time one to the other. And we can relate these because they
leave traces in our bodies and minds—marks to which we can come back, and
refer to. Culture gives us means to consolidate or complement this marking of
our experiences, for instance through lullabies, tattoos, words, sentences and
concepts—through semiotic means.
Human thinking and activities are enabled because we perceive the world as
inhabited by signs, and it is through some sort of translation of these signs in our
mind that we can think, create and guide our action (Freud 2001a; Peirce 1878;
Valsiner 2007; Vygotskiĭ 1934). These signs can be very simple, allowing us to
discriminate between some A and non-A, but they can also be much more complex,
as these get organized in groups, sets and hierarchies, which can be more or less
socially guided (Valsiner 2001; Vygotskiĭ 1934; Zittoun, 2011). Also, these semiotic
forms can take various modalities—to our human minds, colors, shapes, melodies,
spatial arrangements and rhythms, words, other people’s ways of moving, smells,
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temperature, are signs—we use them, or refer to them, at times not consciously, and
so they stand for something else—an atmosphere, a general mood, a meaning.
The Person as Subject
The notion of “subject” can be best defined after an etymological excursus. In Latin,
an “object” was objectum: “what is placed in front of”, what affects the senses (14th
century). A “subject” was “what is subordinated to” (but also, paradoxically 12th
century: “what has a nature of its own”). Eventually, the “subject” becomes in the
19th century “the individual being, the person as the origin of an action or an
influence” (Rey 1998). Hence, the contemporary “subject” results from a semantic
inversion: from the subject of something else, it is today what escapes subjugation
and stands detached, facing its object. Cases of semantic inversion suggest an
inherent tension in the basic idea (Freud 2001b). And in effect, this basic probably
still suggests the journey that allows a person to become a “subject”: a subject has
detached him or herself, to some extent, from the pressures and tensions from her
surroundings, and to his inner tendency to remain the same, simply act or repeat
oneself. To become a subject, one needs to detach from self and from the others and
the world.
By analogy, this paper makes the following psychological argument: the “subject”
emerges in, or out of the semiotic streams of social and personal determinations that
always traverse and guide the person. Social and behavioral sciences have largely
analyzed these channeling forces—social representations and beliefs, institutions,
interactions with significant others, as well as one’s personal history. Yet much less
attention has been given to how, still, unique persons, a unique subjectivity, can at
each emerge out of these streams of determinations. Here, I argue that subjectivity
results from some process of retracting, or carving out of these streams, so at to
generate a space from which the person can reflect, remember, and imagine.1
Representing the Emerging Subject
In this paper I propose a visual model to represent the person, as it is located in an
irreversible time, and at the confluence of many ongoing dialogues with others,
objects and the world. Visual models concretize ideas; they help us to put them in
front of our mind’s eyes, and thus once internalized, become tools for thinking. As
such, they become secondary signs (Vygotskiĭ 1934)—they can guide our theoretical
imagination, or our analysis of real-life situations. But of course, any metaphor has its
limits, which can at times over-constrain our theoretical thinking (Leary 1994). In
what follows, I choose to elaborate a mid-range model—a model which is concrete
enough to easily refer to specific situations, and abstract enough to participate to the
elaboration of more general theories accounting for human experience (Zittoun
2008). Working visually, I will thus progress by complementation, adding up the
1 This thus pursues an investigation on the possibility of accounting for a “thinking space” (Perret-
Clermont 2004) or an “interiority” (Zittoun et al. 2003; Zittoun and Perret-Clermont 2009) in sociocultural
approaches in psychology.
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elements I need to account of the emergence of the subject in a social and cultural
environment.
The First Distance
The most elementary psychological movement, and the most fundamental, is that of
“arrachement”, to strip off from the here-and-now of the ever new moment. This
demands a first suspension, a first movement of one’s attention above what one does
and feels. The emergence of the self is the elementary capacity to take distance from
the flow of experience, the always renewed experience of being-here and now in a
feeling and experiencing body (see Fig. 1).
In this first model, the dot represents the experience I AM or I EXPERIENCE A.
The first detachment from this dot, is the minimal distance that enables to see or
perceive THAT I EXPERIENCE. It can be very elementary, as when one realizes
being thirsty, or more sophisticated, as when in the course of a surgery a surgeon
monitors his own actions (Moreira 2006). Ontogenetically, the possibility of emerging
as subject is progressively built through first experiences and interactions, as the child
starts to realize that his or needs can or cannot be satisfied by his carers, or when he
experiences having a different perspective on objects (Fonagy et al. 2002; Winnicott
1988). Microgenetically, we keep exerting such minimal distance on a daily basis—as
when I stop writing realizing a spelling mistake. Of course, through life, as people
learn from experience, and master complex cultural systems, their modes of distanc-
ing become also more deliberate, complex, or abstract—as in complex scientific
reflection, Asian meditation, mechanical expertise or when using proverbs.
In this model, this distance is represented by an arrow stemming out of the dot, and
returning on it. By this loop, the person can reflect upon her action or experience. It
has two main future developments: on the one side, this basic movement that will
enable generalization or abstraction; on the other side, this loop will enable to think
time or in time. One need in effect to step out of here and now to see that it is not
WHAT WAS and to consider, in a more or less subtle way, WHAT WILL or WHAT
COULD be.
Fig. 1 Elementary semiotic mediation
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Feeding-in Distance
But what is the process designated by the arrow made of, psychologically? In the
framework proposed here, the arrow is the flow of our experience mediated by signs.
And these signs can be of different origins.
In this next step, the loop of distancing from self to self-as-object, thus becoming a
subject, is represented as fed, and traversed, by what can be schematized by two main
semiotic streams (the curly lines) (see Fig. 2).
The first semiotic stream comes from the social world. First constituted by the
presence and the interaction with others, it very soon becomes made of traces of such
socially shared experiences, and signs, language, and objects which have been
produced by others. Hence, this line represents the social and cultural material that
always crosses the person’s experience, that is internalized, and that always already
mediates our experience of the world. It thus designates the inherent dialogicality of
our experience (Bakhtin 1982; Grossen and Salazar Orvig 2011; Marková 2005): we
act and think through the echoes of other people’s experiences, words that have been
used and signs produced by others, met in specific situated interactions, and we will
always keep adding to the generalized circulation of meanings. This stream locates
the person in a social and cultural time. This social semiotic stream is thus the first
string with which we will knit a form of consistency out of the immensities of
possible life forms.
The second semiotic stream comes from one’s past experience. It is at the same
time the sum and synthesis of one has done, enjoyed, suffered, learned, or reflected
upon. This line results from past embodied perceptions and emotions, experiences of
interactions with others and things, bodies of knowledge that have progres-
sively been mastered, categories that have been met when moving through
various social situations, as well as one’s personal life philosophy. This
personal stream includes memories and therefore anticipation and hopes. It is
thus what confers the person a sense of personal continuity. It constitutes the
second stream permanently crossing the person’s here-and-now loops of dis-
tancing, and feeds in inner dialogicality; it is the second string for the knitting
of our subjectivity.
Fig. 2 Streams feeding-in basic distancing
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The Knitting Metaphor
At any moment, this model suggests, the person’s capacity to distance from her
experience is nourished by semiotic streams coming from the social and cultural
world, and from one’s own life trajectories. The model thus suggests that subjectivity
results from the junction of inner-dialogue and outer-dialogue, or the junction of
history and one’s story. The metaphor of knitting can thus be pursued: the subjectivity
results from the binding of these semiotic streams through time (Fig. 3).
This is where the conceptual (if not ontological) problem springs again: if subjec-
tivity is the result of the junction of socio-cultural discourses and personal history
through time, how can we account for unique life trajectories and individualities?
There are two ways to answer. The minimal answer takes the knitting metaphor as
presented so far, and argues that as no two persons live exactly in the same point in
time and space, and that no two histories are exactly the same path, then the process
of knitting—itself located in time—can never give twice the same result. The
objection to this is that if it accounts for uniqueness, it does not account for surprise
and creativity: for if subjectivity is just binding what was and what there is, how can
we account for people’s fate-defying choices, for artists’ and scientists’ inventions, or
for daily life-choices which escape any social or statistical prediction? Therefore, the
second, dynamic answer, it that to account for subjectivity, we need to account not
only for the wool lines and patterns created by the knitting, but also what enables the
patterns to be seen: the fact that that there is space in and around the knitted patters.
Knitted patterns appear only because, at the same time, an empty space is carved out
of the fabric—here emphasized through the magnifying glass in Fig. 3.
If we reason back from the knitting model to psychological reality, then we can also
say that people’s life’s actions, thoughts and decisions not only result from what was
there (and is potentially visible to the observer)—social and cultural streams of deter-
mination, one’s past trajectory—but also from what is not already given (and visible to
the observer). If we come back to our first model (Fig. 1), the interesting thing is the
loop. What is the space emptied out of the knitting? What supports the loop?
The Emerging Self-model
The proposition here is that subjectivity is precisely a precondition for the
whole psychological production of the self—and that subjectivity can be
Fig. 3 The emergence of self in a semiotic fabric
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conceived as what is constantly carved out, and generates a space in what is
given. Yet subjectivity is not only as secondary product of repetitive determi-
nation as the knitting metaphor suggests. Subjectivity is rather a primary, co-
emergent property of the system constituted by the person and her social,
historical and cultural environment.
To account for subjectivity as a co-emergent property, both created and creating
one’s unique position in the world, another model is needed. Therefore the following
dynamic, star-like model is proposed (Fig. 4):
The reader is now kindly required to engage in a short exercise of imagination.
Consider that this star-like model takes place in a three-dimensional universe, where
things keep moving (like in a galaxy). Consider then that each curved line, going
from one end of an arm, passing through the center, going to the other arm, coming
back through the center, going to the first side and back again, figures a perpetual,
eight-shaped sinusoidal movement. Third, imagine then that each eight-shaped
movement is dynamically dependent from the others: that means that the end of a
loop then moves to another one, in such way that a variation in one of the movement—
it trajectory, broader or longer, its speed—will affect the others. Fourth, imagine that
these eight-shaped loops cross in their middle of their trajectory. Yet imagine that these
trajectories do not exactly cross at the same point, but rather, that there is some
mismatch between these crossing points, in such a way that there is always some
empty space at the heart of the system. You may now have in mind a model engaged in
a perpetual movement, supporting itself, yet constantly renewed by the energy it
produces as well as the tensions of the field, or the space, in which it takes
place—something like a pulsar, or a irregular system of planets. Finally, imagine
that, depending on his internal movements, this system irregularly rotates upon
itself, and that it moves through space—and that doing so, it leaves a trace, like
a comet or a shooting star.
My proposition is that this schema offers a viable model of the dynamic emergence
of the subject at the junction of the dynamic social and cultural streams:
(1) We can first consider the time-space environment in which we leave as a three
dimensional space—at each moment of our life, we are in a specific social and
geographical location, which gives us a perspective on where we are and on the
rest of the possible spaces and times;
Others 
Cultural 
artefact/Objects 
Shared 
discourses 
Social norms 
Fig. 4 A star-like model
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(2) Second, consider that each attractor around which these eight-shaped trajecto-
ries unfolds, which constitute the “poles”, or arms of the star-like shape,
represent the “others” of one’s real-world or inner dialogues, the persons, social
entities or discourses which are likely to participate to the making of the person,
at one specific moment in time and space. Here for the sake of demonstration, I
will consider four or five poles, constituted by the other persons with whom one
interact in a given situation, the social norms which are active, the objects and
artifacts which mediate the current activity, the social knowledge and discourse
what people mobilize in that situation—but these can be multiplied as much as
required;
(3) The third idea of mutual co-determination suggests that at each moment, the
weight of one of these social streams might be reinforced, or counterbalanced,
by another—these social streams always create a field of tensions;
(4) If the crossing of these trajectories generates and empty space—like the hole in
the knitting—then this space would designate the location of the subjectivity: it
is carved out, or emerges from these streams, and at the same time, is the
creation of an unique synthesis, through which the person, depending on her
story, is here-and-now creating her participation to the world;
(5) Finally, the trace of this always emergent core through time and space would
constitute the person’s story.
In the two following sections, these five aspects are transposed on a psychological
place, expanded and illustrated.
Activating the Model
What can this model show? The two first aspects are quite trivial and descriptive: the
model analyses the situation of a specific person in one time and one location; in each
specific situation, the person will be located in a unique configuration, or in a system
made out the “poles” of the model. Hence, the actualization of the model is very
different if it is made for a seventeen years old boy from an immigrant family in a
French class in a Swiss vocational class, or a seventeen old boy from a local
established family in a French class in pre-academic gymnasium—even though these
schools might actually be geographically distant from less than two 200 meters.2
The third aspect, the mutual dependency of the person’s looping streams, demands
a more specific illustration. Imagine a young woman who wants to get closer to
another person—a fiancé from the neighborhood—but feels impeded by other per-
sons and social norms not to—parents will not want the daughter to marry a man
2 Most concrete examples are taken from (or inspired by) the SYRES project (symbolic resources at school)
(see Grossen, Zittoun & Ros, 2012; Zittoun & Grossen, 2012, as well as Ros and Grossen 2009; Zittoun et
al. 2010). The project’s goal was to identify if students could use literary and philosophical texts met at
school as symbolic resources, and eventually examined the roles between cultural experiences in and out of
school. It included observations in 15 classes in 3 upper-secondary schools, questionnaires with 205
students on their cultural experiences, interviews with 16 teachers and 20 students on their relationship
to cultural elements in and out of schools, and 6 focus groups with students about classroom situations in
which engage personal matters in discussions about literary or philosophical texts. One example is taken
from another project with its reference; the remaining examples are imagined on the basis of past research
and indicated as such.
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from a different social or national group. Yet the woman might decide to override the
parental advices, and ignore the norms. She might feel supported in her decision
because she knows a novel or a song describing a situation very close to hers—a
cultural element such as Titanic or Romeo and Juliet—which can be used a symbolic
resource to inspire her resistance to these parents and what she believes to be unjust
social norms.
The fourth aspect, that of the carving out of a personal interiority, or the emergence
of the subject, can be illustrated with the same example. In effect, that young woman
could resist to one of the forces of the configuration in which she is located, first
because she was also in a dialogical field of tensions: her desires where not that of her
parents, the norms contradicts her experience of meeting that man, etc. This mis-
match, the tensions, is a first invitation to step out of the situation, to take the distance
to reflect and find a solution (Marková 2005; Zittoun et al. 2003). But this distance
necessary to reflect is then nourished or supported by other semiotic means: her
experience of watching Titanic or listening to Romeo’s and Juliet’s opera, and being
moved by the narratives and transported by images and sounds, finding an echo in her
experience (Zittoun 2006). So the space of her reflection, borne out of the mismatch
of social and symbolic tensions, is not empty; it is now inhabited and vibrant of her
emotions, memories, whishes, impossible dreams, and imagination. In that sense,
thus, one’s subjectivity is carved out of the streams of determination, and uniquely
made alive. It is then from this unique location that the person can then decide to act
symbolically or concretely—to take distance from some streams, give more impor-
tance to others, and so on.
The dynamic co-regulation of the poles and the emergence of the core interiority
are themselves probably co-emergent, as they occur in an irreversible time. An
example can illustrate such mutual dependencies. A student in a secondary school
is asked by the teacher to read and comment a literary text—a sequence of
Dostoyevsky’s Player. The relevant others here are the teacher, the other students,
and in a more remote way, his family and his friends from outside school. The social
situation of the secondary school classroom carries certain norms and guides what
reading and commenting means; in principle, in this type of school, one should not
talk about things which happen out of school, and one should learn to analyze the
literary form of texts. Students of this class are also supposed to have acquired certain
analytical skills and grammatical and literary knowledge, as well as know-how
of the routines of discussing literary texts. The student has read the text and
has been moved by it, as it made him think of personal experiences—a family
drama due to his uncle’s addiction to money games. Now in that particular
configuration, what will the student do?
Two possible answers to the teacher’s request can be described here. In the first
option, the student starts reading aloud, and then analyses the structure of the text. In
the second, the student reads the text silently, and then says that it makes him feel sad
and reminds him of his uncle. In the first case, in the student’s configuration, the
expectations of the teacher and the social norms demanding to mobilize specific skills
would have been stronger, and the subjectivity of the student is expressed by way of
keeping his emotions and memories for himself. In the second case, life out of school
would have been fore-grounded, and social norms actualized by the school context
would have less strength; the students’ subjective choice is expressed by his reflective
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skills and poetic capacities, rather than literary-specific ones. The point is that either
choice, which might be more or less deliberate and reflective, is an expression of
one’s subjectivity: it demands the externalization, in a specific configuration in time
and space, of the result of one’s unique synthesis and positioning—whether that
expression is in apparent conformity or rejection of dominant norms.
The present model thus suggest that each of the poles dynamically interacts with
each other; and yet, the person—represented at the heart of the crossing line, can,
through these multiple cultivations, develop as an unique individual, with a margin
for unique reinvention.
The Historicity of the Subject
The model suggests that the components always maintain dynamic relationship, and
that it is under constant evolution in its three-dimensional sense. Of course, one of the
limits of such a model is that it is very difficult to describe the configuration of the
model in which a person is at a given moment in time, and the dynamic of current
transformation of the model in time and space.3 However, the model is meant to
highlight these constant mutual dependencies and their temporality. Here, therefore, I
give a special attention to the fifth aspect of the model, its dynamic and temporal
nature—which I show at various scales.
First, time can be analyzed at a micro-genetic scale, in a given situation, in a sphere
of experience. Let us return to the example of the Dostoyevsky student: after he or she
engages in one of the possible answers, the teacher (and his peers) will react to that
proposition. The student might also be affected by the teacher’s feedback. If the
teacher prizes him for the first type of answer (reinforcing the norms), the student
might be encouraged to give more importance to literary analysis, and so give an even
better answer in a next similar situation. But also, he might find it all too-easy, and try
to find another way to reply his teacher in the next similar situation, for example by
questioning why one should focus his analysis on the literary form when much more
important issues are raised by the text. If the teacher prizes him for the second answer,
the student might feel encouraged to develop his reflexive capacities and the links
between school knowledge and daily life, thus weakening some of the active social
constrains. Let us even imagine further events: the praised first student might
disinvest school, while the student with the “bad” answer might become a poet,
and then a teacher… Hence, because of its looping nature, the temporal dimension of
the systems allow for showing the dynamics between interpersonal and intrapersonal
dialogicality, constitutive of the emergence of the subject.
The system has a history. A second scale of analysis—which might correspond to
so-called meso-level analysis—might render the evolution of the system more visible.
For this, we need to follow the evolution of the system around a specific theme, or
configuration, in the life of the person—a theme that has some durability, and that
3 A problem that has similarities with the so-called uncertainty principle in quantum physics as described
by Heisenberg, who showed the impossibility of measuring both current properties and momentum of a
particle. It is not only a matter of combining perspectives: the very process of measure will affect in an
unpredictable way the system made of very small quantities. This has been questioned over the years (for
instance see Busch and Lahti 1985). To some extend, but for different reasons, the same issue appears in
any social and human system under study…
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moves through spheres of experience (e.g., from school, to work, to family life). At
the scale of months, perhaps years in a person’s life, the system develops some
stability around its attractors: significant others, social knowledge, might be replaced
one by the other, even if their central organizing roles in one given aspect of the
person’s life have some continuity. Take the example of a young woman’s interest for
Arts. As a child, her significant other was first her mother showing her beautiful
dresses in a children’s book, then a grandmother bringing her to the Museum to
admire Degas Dancers beautiful tutus; these were soon replaced by a group of
girlfriends with whom they enjoyed drawing real-size girls, and finally, by an
attentive teacher noticing her gift for color and encouraging her to study Arts (Zittoun
2010). In the life of the young woman, the mother has not “disappeared”, she is in the
background of the significant persons who have supported her painting. In the model,
the loop organized around persons-who-support her painting—the attractor—can thus
take place, although the actual person—mother, grand-mother, friends, etc.- replace,
or even more, add to each other, in respect to that particular interest. And in respect to
that interest, we see how the young woman’s interest—her commitment to Arts—
slowly emerges as her subjective life-path.4
Let us move one step further. If we can imagine evolving configurations around
specific interests or topics that have some stability through a longer period in one’s
person life, how can the model represent how people move from one activity to the
other, one sphere of experience to the other, along the day or along the year? Should
we imagine that one model substitutes another one—the person as painter, as student,
etc.? The suggestion is here precisely that the model allow for representing the
moment-to-moment reorganization of one’s field of experience. The model keeps
evolving around the core that is the emergent person. Rather, some loops fade out as
some attractors get less important, while other can emerge; other, can also be trans-
formed in their weight and importance. The good student physic teacher’s figure do
not vanish as he plays hard-rock in a basement—these become simply less relevant,
temporarily overwritten by his musician friends and models. It will come back as
soon as the student goes back to class. Yet also, sometimes these changes through
activities bring some of these attractors to mingle, exclude each other or fuse,
bringing to new life choices. A young person in a technical school might keep
separate is interests for rock and engineering separate, and shared them with different
others; another might actually realize he might combine them by becoming a sound
engineer. In the first case, the person’s system would be substantially reorganized as
he moves from one sphere to the other—relevant objects, knowledge, others are
replaced by others—while in the second case, the fusion of previously separated
loops would demand a deeper reorganization of the system. Again, in either case, the
emerging subjectivity is that, what remains the same through these changes, while
being constantly produced by them.
4 In that sense, over time, significant Others, the meanings they have, or the laws that organize people’s
lives regarding specific objects or activities—that is, in specific spheres of experience—are often synthesis
of many encounters, or accumulated experience. One’s relationship to mathematics is not built in one day, it
is a long history that can go back to childhood games, school mockery, exam failure, tax-form-filing,
company management, and so on. Like Freud, writing about dream figures, suggested (2001a), these
internalized others are less one specific person, than a composite, a synthesis—like when, in the early times
of photography, many people’s negatives were captured on one same photographic paper, so as to produce a
composite of persons, with some dominant emerging figures and erasing people’s specificities.
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Through the years, from a forth, ontogenetic perspective, imagine now a bifurca-
tion point on the basis of the previous case—the person that plays hard rock and
enjoys physics. In the first option, he decides to put more effort in his music,
rehearses more hours a day, and starts to play concerts; his school commitments
drops but he achieves a simple technical training which enables him to support
himself; music becomes his main involvement. In the second case, the person
becomes very interested in more challenging physics, and decides to try to be
admitted in a more advanced school program. He works a lot for it, and has less
time to go to rehearsals and concerts, and eventually his rock-band friends replace
him. He does not care much, as he enjoys physics and can still play for himself now
and then. In that case, science becomes a main commitment; it might take more
place in the person’s life, involve many more significant others, etc. Such exam-
ples might help us to reflect upon the evolution of the model through time: we
might say that through time, some attractors might change their relative impor-
tance; some might play a more dominant role in the system of curves and lines,
while others will reduce their amplitude and intensity. Some might even fade out,
and with them the corresponding loop will need to be redesigned or transform its
trajectory; inversely, some new attractors might emerge and thus redefine the
system. Thus, it is the whole equilibrium and momentum of the system which
might be transformed as the person moves through life. And again, the resultant of
these transformations of that system is also its emergent property—the definition
of an unique life trajectory.
Finally, as suggested, the heart of the model—the subjective space—emerges from
the mismatch of the crossing loops of the various components in tension. If the whole
system evolves with time, with looping trajectories redefined, attractors evolving or
replaced, then it follows that that space itself will be constantly renegotiated,
reshaped, or reconfigured. Also, as suggested, the whole system can be seen as
rotating in and moving through a three dimensional space, given its own
momentum; thus, the core “space” is also moving in space (Fig. 5). In that sense,
Fig. 5 Evolutive system in a three-dimensional space
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one might say that the system, and especially this central heart that is subjectivity, is
leaving a trace in that space. That trace of the subjectivity is what we consider as
being the person’s life course, or life trajectory. From an external perspective, it might
be the history of observable changes in commitments, relationships, social positions
and actions. From a more subjective perspective, the resultant itself is the perspective
that each person can have, at one given moment, on her own past trajectory and on
where she might go. How people think about this trace of their experience—the life
story—of course depends from the perspective from which they examine it, whether
they simply reflect on it or narrate it to a researcher (Bruner 1990; Kvale and
Brinkmann 2008). In any case, what we, as researcher, access when we question
people about their experience, is precisely this emergent part of a subjective
experience.
The model has thus ambition to give us a clear, intuitive grasp of the possibility of
the emergence of the subject, out of complex, dialogical, social and cultural others,
and in time.
What is a New Model Useful For?
There is no use in producing additional models if these do not add anything to
the existing state of understanding—both for parsimony purpose (Occam’s
razor), and from a pragmatic perspective (James 1904). Models should allow us
to see the world better, to improve our understanding of it, or guide our actions upon
the world.
In that respect, this model is a rudimentary attempt to offer a better representation—
to visualize and mentally grasp—of the mutual dependencies of social and cultural
processes in human development, and of the possibility for the person to emerge as
unique. Its quality over other models is its simple complexity and openness (branches
can be added, taken away, as the basic principles stay), its capacity to account of the
circulation of semiotic flows enabling dialogical processes—in the world and in the
person—and its temporality. Mainly, it breaks away from linear, two dimensional
representations and thus might support our thinking of complex phenomena in terms
of configurations, not simple causalities. In terms of use, it might become an analytical
tool for better grasping situations in which persons are both constrained, and can
find means to emancipate and expand their inner distance. Finally, the model can
probably be combined with others, as for instance trajectory models (Sato and
Valsiner 2010) that allow retracing trajectories from a bird-, or better, a satellite-eye
perspective.
Above all, such model might allow us to make a step toward a better understanding
of the emergence of people’s unique melody of living (Zittoun et al. in press)—how,
in their sets of constraints, social determination, oversaturated languages, people keep
creating their unique trajectory, in an unique style—the unique mark of our passage in
an infinite universe of possibilities.
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